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1 Introduction  
 
The Bill of Rights enshrined in the South African Constitution1 forbids unfair 
discrimination. Section 9(1) reads that everyone is equal before the law and 
has the right of equal protection and benefit of the law. Subsection (2) reads 
that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms 
and that the promotion of equality may be achieved by legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. In terms of subsections (3) and (4) the 
state or a person may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against 
anyone inter alia on the ground of marital status.    
 
The notion of equality does not only include equality in the formal sense of the 
word, but also substantive equality.2 Legal categories or differentiation for 
purposes of the law between such categories, are therefore not precluded. In 
fact the principle to be applied was encapsulated in the Aristotelian concept of 
distributive justice. Aristotle (384-322 BC) defined the principle of justice that 
ought to regulate the political distribution of honours, material goods and other 
similar objects as follows:  
 
 
*  Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus).  
1   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. Hereafter the Constitution.  
2 Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook at 233. The authors point out that a purely 
formal understanding of equality risks neglecting the deepest commitments of the 
Constitution. S 9 must therefore be read as grounded on a substantive conception of 
equality. The Constitutional Court explained it as follows in President of the RSA v Hugo 
1997 4 SA 1 (CC) in par 41: “We … need to develop a concept of unfair discrimination 
which recognises that although a society which affords each human being equal treatment 
on the basis of equal worth and freedom is our goal, we cannot achieve that goal by 
insisting upon identical treatment in all circumstances before that goal is achieved. Each 
case, therefore, will require a careful and thorough understanding of the impact of the 
discriminatory action upon the particular people concerned to determine whether its overall 
impact is one which furthers the constitutional goal of equality or not. A classification which 
is unfair in one context may not necessarily be unfair in a different context.”   
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There will be the same equality between the persons and the shares 
(to be distributed): the ratio between the shares will be the same as 
that between the persons. If the persons are not equal, their (just) 
shares will not be equal; but this is the source of quarrels and 
recriminations, when equals have and are awarded unequal shares 
or unequal equal shares.3     
 
This contribution will focus on the notion of equality as expounded above in 
respect of matrimonial property regimes against the background of a recent 
decision by the Constitutional Court in Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund4 
(hereafter RAF). In its decision the court pronounced on the constitutional 
validity of claims for damages of parties against one another where they are 
married in community of property compared to where they are married out of 
community of property.    
 
2       A brief overview over the matrimonial dispensations in South Africa  
 
In essence there are two matrimonial dispensations in South Africa – marriages 
in and marriages out of community of property. They differ substantially from 
one another.   
 
2.1     Marriage in community of property  
 
In the absence of an antenuptial contract providing otherwise, marriage ex lege 
creates community of property and of profit and loss – communio bonorum. 
Community comes into being by operation of law5 as soon as the marriage is 
solemnised. It can be described as a universal economic partnership of the 
spouses in which all their assets and liabilities are merged in a joint estate in 
which both spouses, irrespective of the value of their contributions hold equal 
shares.6 Various explanations have been offered with regard to the legal nature  
 
 
 
3  Van der Vyver Constitutional Protection at 289.  
4  Van der Merwe v Road Accident Fund 2006 4 SA 230 (CC).  
5  See eg Watt v Watt 184 2 SA 455 (WLD).  
6  See ia Hahlo Husband and Wife 158; Visser and Potgieter Family Law 95; Robinson, Human and 
    Boshoff South African Family Law 97.   
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of community7 but the exposition of the Appellate Division in Estate Sayle v 
CIR8 is the generally accepted view today. Spouses own the assets of the joint 
estate in equal undivided shares which means that no asset can physically be 
divided and no rights pertaining to the joint estate can accrue exclusively to one 
of the spouses – during the subsistence of the marriage the shares of the 
spouses are indissolubly tied up. Neither spouse may dispose of his or her 
‘tied-up’ share in the joint estate by an act inter vivos but may do so, however, 
by will or other act mortis causa.9 In Ex parte Menzies et Uxor10 it was decided 
that co-ownership of the joint estate is a species of bounded co-ownership – 
the half share is not only undivided; it is also indivisible.11    
 
The general rule is that all the assets that the spouses had before the marriage 
as well as assets they accumulate after entering into the marriage fall into the 
joint estate. At the moment of conclusion of the marriage, the ownership of the 
assets pass ex lege to the joint estate and the normal rules as to the passing of 
ownership do not apply. It is trite, however, that spouses may retain a separate 
estate in that certain exceptions do exist where assets do not fall into the joint 
estate. This would include, inter alia, assets excluded in a will or donation 
agreement, assets subject to a fideicommissum, non-patrimonial 
compensation, et cetera. As for liabilities, it is clear that pre-nuptial liabilities 
form part of the joint estate without any exception. With regard to post-nuptial 
liabilities a distinction needs to be drawn between contractual and delictual 
debts. In the case of contractual debts, a valid contract would bind the joint 
estate and the creditor can claim from the joint estate or from the spouse who 
has incurred the debt. It is important to note that the Insolvency Act 24 of 
193612 does not make provision for the existence of separate estates as far as 
marriage in community of property is concerned and apparently no protection is  
 
7   Eg that the creation of the joint estate is similar to the conclusion of a partnership; that the husband 
 was the sole owner of the joint estate or that the joint estate constituted a separate legal persona. 
 See eg Hahlo Husband and Wife 158 for a discussion of these theories.  
8   Estate Sayle v CIR 1945 AD 388.  
9   Hahlo Husband and Wife 159; Robinson, Human and Boshoff South African Family Law 97.  
10   Ex parte Menzies et Uxor 1993 3 SA 799 (CPD).  
11   See also Visser and Potgieter Family Law 95.  
12   Hereafter the Insolvency Act.  
 
JA ROBINSON                                                  PER/PELJ 2007(10)3 
73/159 
 
afforded to the separate assets of the other spouse. As for delictual liability, 
section 19 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 198413 now governs the legal 
position. It provides that where a spouse incurs delictual liability, the creditor 
must first claim compensation from the separate estate of the person who 
committed the delict. If there is no such separate estate or if the separate 
estate is too small to satisfy the claim, the amount of compensation may be 
claimed from the spouse's joint estate in which case adjustment in favour of the 
innocent spouse must take place at the time of dissolution of the joint estate.    
 
At common law, there were no monetary or proprietary claims between 
spouses married in community of property. The reasoning was fairly simple and 
straightforward – where everything is owed or owned in common, there can be 
no room for debts or rights of property. In Tomlin v London & Lancashire 
Insurance Co Ltd14 the court explained the position as follows:   
 
In my judgment, not the husband’s power of administration, but the 
existence by law of a joint estate was and is at common law the 
obstacle to an action between spouses married with community of 
property, an insuperable obstacle in so far as one claims from the 
other money or assets out of the joint estate, for, ex hypothesi, 
neither has a separate estate and what he or she recovers from the 
other comes out of the joint estate and falls back instantly into the 
joint estate.15 (Italics added.)    
 
An inroad into the common law position was created by the legislature with the 
Matrimonial Property Act, which provides that –    
 
notwithstanding the fact that a spouse is married in community of 
property –    
 
(a) any amount recovered by him by way of damages, other than 
             damages for patrimonial loss, by reason of delict committed against      
             him, does not fall into the joint estate, but becomes his separate  
             property;  
 
13   Hereafter the Matrimonial Property Act.  
14   Tomlin v London & Lancashire Insurance 1962 2 SA 30 (D).  
15  Enforceable rights between spouses may arise in respect of assets excluded from the community; of      
         the duty of support; (formerly) for damages other than damages for patrimonial loss flowing from 
         bodily injuries (see text accompanying n 25 et seq) and for the mandament van spolie where 
         peaceful possession is disturbed.  
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(b) he may recover from the other spouse damages, other than 
damages for patrimonial loss, in respect of bodily injuries suffered by 
him and attributable either wholly or in part to the fault of that 
spouse.16  
 
It is clear that spouses can freely sue each other in contract or in delict for non-
patrimonial loss suffered by the plaintiff and attributable either wholly or in part 
to the fault of the other spouse17 as all non-patrimonial compensation a spouse 
receives during the marriage for a delict committed against him or her falls into 
his or her separate estate.18 The compensation is not patrimonial in nature, but 
comprises satisfaction (solatium or troosgeld) for an infringement of the 
spouse’s personality rights, for example for libel, and compensation for pain 
and suffering for personal injuries that the spouse has sustained.    
 
2.2     Marriage out of community of property   
 
The other matrimonial system in South Africa is marriage out of community of 
property. A marriage will be out of community, inter alia, if the parties, prior to 
the conclusion of the marriage entered into a valid antenuptial contract whereby 
community of property is excluded.19 The main characteristics of marriage out 
of community entail that no merging of estates takes place so that both 
spouses retain their own separate estates and that each spouse manages his 
or her estate independently of the other spouse. After entering into marriage, 
each spouse retains the assets he or she had prior to the marriage and assets 
acquired after the conclusion of the marriage fall into the separate estate of the 
spouse who acquired them. Contrary to marriage in community of property 
spouses married out of community of property are normal co-owners of 
property or property jointly acquired. Each party retains full capacity to act with 
respect to his or her own estate and spouses can contract independently. They  
 
16   S 18 of the Matrimonial Property Act.  
17   Hahlo Husband and Wife 255; Robinson, Human and Boshoff South African Family Law 99.  
18   Robinson, Human and Boshoff South African Family Law 99.  
19   Other instances are where, after conclusion of the marriage, the parties enter ito s 21 of the  
 Matrimonial Property Act into a valid post-nuptial contract; or where the legal system where the 
  husband is domiciled directs that the marriage will be out of community of property.  
JA ROBINSON                                                  PER/PELJ 2007(10)3 
75/159 
 
may also contract with each other. Spouses are not responsible for each 
other’s delicts and they may institute delictual claims against each other.    
 
3       The decision in Van der Merwe  
 
3.1    Facts  
 
The facts of the case were simple. The wife (Applicant) instituted an action 
against the RAF, an insurer which was a statutory body that was liable to 
compensate her for bodily injuries caused by the driving of a motor vehicle. The 
RAF, however, would only be liable if Applicant could institute a lawful claim 
against the driver of the motor vehicle that caused her injuries. In casu the 
parties were married in community of property. Applicant sustained injuries 
when a motor vehicle driven by her husband collided with her. It was common 
cause between the parties that Applicant’s husband had intentionally knocked 
her over. In fact, he went on to reverse over her while she was lying on the 
ground. The parties have since divorced.   
 
Applicant sued for damages arising from the bodily injuries she sustained. The 
RAF raised a special plea to the claim in which it admitted that Applicant was 
entitled to claim non-patrimonial damages, but denied liability to compensate 
applicant for any patrimonial damages by reason of the provisions of section 
18(a) and (b) read with section 19(a) which in effect prohibited claims for 
patrimonial damages between spouses married in community of property. 
Applicant replied that section 18 unfairly discriminated on the ground of marital 
status against spouses married in community of property as opposed to 
spouses married out of community of property.    
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3.2     Decision  
 
The question before the court did not pertain to development of the common 
law, but rather the constitutional validity of section 18(b).20 The Constitutional 
Court particularly considered whether the section discriminated unfairly against 
spouses married in community of property. The RAF contended that even if 
there was a differentiation based on marital status, it was not unfair, or 
alternatively, even if it was unfair, it was justifiable because Applicant had 
adopted the matrimonial regime out of her own choice. In that way, it was 
argued, she waived her right to claim patrimonial damages arising from the 
delict of her husband.21  Even though the concern of the court was not the 
development of the common law, it nonetheless considered it beneficial to 
restate section 18(b)’s common law substratum. It confirmed the common law 
exposition that parties may not sue each other for delictual loss, patrimonial or 
non-patrimonial and continued that:   
 
The rule in effect ousts legal redress for delictual loss of any kind 
arising from the wrongdoing of a spouse against another. The amicus 
(third respondent) argues, and it must be right, that this rule owes its 
origin to the boundless patriarchy in a setting where the husband 
wielded marital power over the wife … and was the exclusive 
administrator of the joint estate. As long as the marriage endured, the 
state was deemed to be one, indivisible and subject to one 
command.22 (Italics added.)   
 
The court stated, however, that this rule of the common law soon fell foul of 
evolving societal notions of gender equality within marriage and the equal worth 
of spouses and legislation, of which section 18 is an example, made inroads 
into the theoretical unity and inviolability of the joint estate.23 It is now possible 
to claim for delictual damages other than for patrimonial loss arising from bodily  
 
 
20   Par 20.  
21   Par 26.  
22   Par 29. Compare, however, the approach of the courts in Tomlin v London & Lancashire Insurance  
 1962 2 SA 30 (D) and Estate v Sayle 1945 AD 388 at 395-396. It would appear that the court in Van  
 der Merwe does not distinguish between the marital power which the husband formerly possessed  
 and the ownership of the estate.  
23   Par 30.  
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injury, and the amount so recovered does not fall into the joint estate but 
becomes the spouse’s separate property in terms of section 18(a).24   
 
Against this background the court turned to the question whether this piece of 
legislative reform that authorises legal redress for non-patrimonial loss, but not 
for patrimonial damages arising from bodily harm, discriminates against 
spouses married in community of property vis-à-vis spouses married out of 
community.25 It addressed mainly two issues to come to a conclusion namely 
the difference between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages and the 
constitutional prohibition against unfair discrimination.   
 
As far as damages are concerned the court affirmed the general point of 
departure that patrimonial damages (special damages) are said to be the true 
equivalent of a person’s loss. They are ordinarily calculable in money. 
Examples of such claims are past and future medical expenses, past and future 
loss of income, loss of earning capacity and loss of support. Non-patrimonial 
damages (general damages) on the other hand are utilised to redress the 
deterioration of a highly personal legal interest that attach to the body and 
personality of the claimant. Such claims therefore are illiquid and not instantly 
sounding in money. They are not susceptible to exact or immediate calculation 
in monetary terms. In fact, the court found, there is no real relationship between 
the money and the loss. Variants of general damages include claims for pain 
and suffering, disfigurement and loss of amenities of life.26 The court concluded 
that:   
 
… it is important to recognise that a claim for non-patrimonial 
damages ultimately assumes the form of a monetary award. Guided 
by the facts of each case and what is just and equitable, courts 
regularly asses and award to claimants general damages sounding in 
money. In this sense, an award of general damages to redress a 
breach of a personality right also accrues to a claimant’s patrimony. 
After all, the primary object of general damages too, in the non-
patrimonial sense, is to make good the loss; to amend the injury. Its  
 
24   Par 31.  
25   Par 32.  
26   Par 38-39.  
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aim too is to place the plaintiff in the same position she or he would 
have been but for the wrongdoing.27 (Italics added.)   
 
In the second place the question whether section 18(b) differentiates between 
spouses married in and out of community of property, the court has no 
hesitation to find that it does differentiate. The court held that the distinction 
created by section 18(b) is in essence between the different proprietary 
consequences of marriage in and out of community – the law denies one class 
of married people a protection or a right the other class enjoys. It must be 
distinguished from the situation where the law withholds from unmarried people 
a protection or a right which it grants to married people.28 When the law 
therefore elects to make a differentiation between people or classes of people it 
will fall foul of the constitutional standard of equality if it is shown that the 
differentiation does not have a legitimate purpose or a rational relationship to 
the purpose advanced to validate it. Absent the pre-condition of a rational 
connection to the purpose advanced to validate a law, it will prima facie 
constitute unfair differentiation and infringe the right to equal protection.29 In this 
sense, the court held, the impugned law would be inconsistent with the equality 
norm that the Constitution imposes, in as much as it breaches the rational 
differentiation standard set by the equality clause in the Constitution.    
 
By refusing the physically brutalised spouse a claim for patrimonial loss, section 
18(b) seeks to retain the notional purity of the community of property and to 
escape the futility of damages that would come from and return to the joint 
patrimony.30 However, the government purpose for preserving the unity of the 
joint estate to avoid the futility of spousal claims for bodily injury has fallen away 
– sections 18, 19 and 20 which all have a bearing on claims for non-patrimonial 
loss arising from personal injury have irreversibly undermined that purpose.31 In 
this respect the court concluded that:  
 
27   Par 41.  
28   Par 45-47. In Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) the specified ground of marital status was 
         engaged because the impugned law accorded benefits to married people which it did not afford to  
         unmarried people.  
29   Par 49.  
30   Par 51. 31  Par 52.  
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 … there is no rational account why the scheme or purpose of the Act 
stops short of granting redress in the form of patrimonial damages 
resulting from spousal violence. The claim would not be futile 
because the proceeds of the claim would not accrue to the common 
patrimony but become separate property of the battered spouse. In 
that event, clearly the guilty spouses will not benefit from their willful 
or negligent misdeeds.32    
 
Equally absurd is to withhold from spouses in joint estates 
patrimonial redress against physical abuse but to grant it to spouses 
married out of community of property.33 (Italics added.)   
 
The court then applied its exposition of section 18(b) to the nature of damages. 
It found that there was no rational divide between patrimonial and non-
patrimonial damages under these circumstances and that the law of damages 
recognised both special and general damages to afford the fullest possible 
redress for delictual harm. By prohibiting recovery of patrimonial damages for 
personal injury, section 18(b) arbitrarily prevents the fullest possible 
compensation for spouses who are victims of violence or other wrongdoing that 
leads to bodily harm by their marriage partners.34 A further indication of the 
arbitrariness is that whilst there are definitional differences between patrimonial 
and non-patrimonial damages, the distinction is often blurred in the case of 
bodily injury claims since the infringed personality interest often causes loss 
that affects both the person and the patrimony.35    
 
The court rejected the argument of the RAF that the limitation of Applicant’s 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law was reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom. 
The argument of the RAF in essence was that marriage was a matter of choice  
 
32  Par 54.  
33  Par 55.  
34  Par 56. The court indicated in par 57 a further point of arbitrariness in that whilst there are definitional  
 differences between patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages the distinction is often blurred in  
 bodily injury claims because the infringed bodily interest often causes loss that affects both the  
 person and the patrimony. Infringement of bodily integrity is therefore not a reliable predictor of the  
 nature or class of damages that may flow. The absence of a reliable distinction between patrimonial  
 and non-patrimonial damages in bodily injury suits therefore in itself demonstrates that the distinction  
 made in s 18(b) is at best tenuous and it consequently falls foul of the requirement of a rational  
 differentiation.  35  Par 57.  
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and so too were the proprietary consequences of marriage – Applicant chose 
marriage in community of property and it was only fair and reasonable that she 
be kept to the immutable consequences of her choice. The court found that this 
argument resolved itself into a waiver defence; it implies an undertaking by 
married people not to attack the legal validity of the laws that regulate their 
marriage.36 This defence is not good in law as the constitutional validity of 
legislation does not derive from the personal preference of a person affected by 
a law, but rather the objective validity of a law stems from the Constitution itself. 
The constitutional obligation of a court to test the objective consistency of a law 
against the Constitution does not depend on, and cannot be frustrated by the 
conduct of litigants or holders of the specific rights.37   
 
3.3     Evaluation   
 
Despite the decision in Van der Merwe satisfying one’s immediate sense of 
justice, it drastically deviates from the common law and legislative prescripts. 
The court clearly applied its extensive powers under sections 172 read with 
section 8(1) of the Constitution.38 Section 172(1)(a) provides that when 
deciding a constitutional matter a court must declare that any law or conduct 
that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to the extent of its 
inconsistency. It may make any order that is just and equitable in terms of 
subsection (b) which may include an order limiting the retrospective effect of 
the declaration of invalidity and an order suspending the invalidity for any 
period and on any condition to allow the competent authority to remedy the 
defect. In terms of section 8(1) the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the  
 
36   Par 59. 37  Par 61.  
38   The court found that s 18(b) is inconsistent with the Constitution and therefore invalid. It ordered that  
 the words “other than damages for patrimonial loss” be severed. This is a direct application of the  
 Constitution. The court did not avail itself of the process commonly known as ‘reading down’. S 8(2)  
 provides that a court must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when it  
 interprets legislation or develops the common law. Before a court will resort to invalidation of 
 legislation (direct application), it must first consider indirectly applying the Bill of Rights to the  
 statutory provision by interpreting it in such a way as to conform to the Bill of Rights (indirect  
 application). With reference to the common law the principle requires the court to develop it in  
 conformity with the Bill of Rights (indirect application) in preference to assessing whether the  
 common law is in conflict with the Bill of Rights (direct application). See Currie and De Waal Bill of  
 Rights Handbook at 64.  
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legislature, the executive, the judiciary and all organs of state. In casu the court 
directly applied the provisions of the Bill of Rights to the dispute39 and justified 
its conclusion that section 18(b) discriminated unfairly against spouses married 
in community on the basis that the distinction between patrimonial and non-
patrimonial damages is arbitrary.   
 
It needs no elaboration that Van der Merwe serves as a clear example of the 
willingness of the Constitutional Court to superimpose the values of the 
Constitution on something as personal as the patrimonial consequences 
spouses wish to pertain to their marriage. However, the court’s reasoning that 
Applicant could not waive her constitutional right to attack the validity of laws 
pertaining to her marriage tends to obscure the difference between the 
patrimonial consequences of marriages in and out of community of property. It 
is trite that in the case of marriage in community of property all assets become 
common by operation of law while the matrimonial property dispensation in the 
case of marriage out of community of property is set out in the antenuptial 
contract between the parties.40 Prima facie it would appear that the court’s 
exposition is correct,41 yet it is a pity that the court did not consider the impact 
of its decision on commercial intercourse where it is normally of particular 
importance for creditors to know whether parties are married in or out of 
community of property. In this respect reference may be made to the insolvency 
of the joint estate.   
 
In Badenhorst v Bekker42 the joint estate of the spouses was sequestrated in 
1985. In 1992 the wife inherited assets from her father which assets were 
specifically excluded from the joint estate in her father’s will. The trustees of the 
joint insolvent estate, however, laid claim to these assets whereupon the wife 
approached the court for a declaratory order that the excluded assets formed 
part of her separate estate and could therefore not be utilised as part of the  
 
39  Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights Handbook at 32.  
40   Par 2.1 and 2.2 supra. See ia Watt v Watt 1984 2 SA 455 (W).  
41   Transnet v Goodman Brothers 2001 1 SA 853 (SCA) par 48.  
42   Badenhorst v Bekker 1994 2 SA 155 (N).  
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insolvent estate. The court took the view that the inheritance could indeed be 
used to pay the creditors of the joint estate.    
 
The court decided the question on three arguments. In the first place, the court 
held, it is trite that a testator may not stipulate in his or her will that an 
inheritance may not be attached or in the event of the sequestration of an 
estate, that it will not form part of the insolvent estate.43 In the second place the 
court referred to the provisions of the Insolvency Act and came to the 
conclusion that the act did not contain any provision specifically pertaining to 
the situation where one of the spouses inherits assets after the joint estate has 
been sequestrated. An interpretation of the provisions of the Insolvency Act 
made it clear that the exclusion of the wife’s assets in the will of her father was 
not covered in any of the provisions of the act, which meant that the assets 
formed part of the joint estate. In the third place the court considered the 
position at common law and reiterated the position as described in the text 
accompanying note 5 supra. It concluded that husband and wife are actually 
co-debtors so that the excluded assets also fell into the joint (insolvent) 
estate.44 The approach of the court was elaborated upon by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Du Plessis v Pienaar45 where it was held that:   
 
Once it is accepted that debts are incurred by persons, rather than by 
their estates, and that when the marriage is in community of property 
both spouses are generally liable for the payment of the debts that 
are incurred by one of them, it follows that a creditor may look to the 
estates of both the debtors for recovery of the debt. In the case of a 
spouse … that estate comprises not only her individual interest in the 
joint estate but also her separate property that falls outside the joint 
estate. … The fact that some of her property is separately owned is 
relevant to the manner in which the property may be dealt with by the 
spouses inter se and to their rights upon dissolution of the marriage 
but does not affect the ordinary right of a creditor to look to all the 
property of a debtor in satisfaction of a debt.46 (Italics added.)   
 
 
43  At 159.  
44  At 171.  
45  Du Plessis v Pienaar 2003 1 SA 671 (SCA).  
46   Par 5.  
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From the exposition set out above it is clear that insolvency of the joint estate of 
spouses married in community of property does not only differ from marriages 
out of community of property, but also creates serious negative consequences 
for spouses married in community of property vis-à-vis spouses married out of 
community of property. However, this is also a factor seriously contemplated by 
creditors in commercial intercourse with spouses as the very fact that spouses 
are married in or out of community of property may directly influence the issue 
of the security that they may offer. A particularly serious question raised by the 
decision in Van der Merwe is whether courts will tamper with this security on 
the basis that marriage in community of property also in this respect is to the 
detriment of spouses so married. The unbridled approach of the court certainly 
suggests that creditors may not hold as strong security as they might wish 
where debtors are married in community of property. It goes without saying that 
this result may not only impact negatively on commercial intercourse, but may 
also give rise to uncertainty.   
 
Flowing from the argument above, and accepting that a spouse’s argument 
under these circumstances prevails, it appears that a further problematic 
situation presents itself – would it be possible for a spouse to be an insolvent 
for purposes of the joint estate and a solvent for purposes of his or her separate 
estate? In Du Plessis the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the line of 
reasoning in Badenhorst, but also went on to make it clear that the spouses 
acquire the status of insolvents.47 It is clear that situations not contemplated by 
the Constitutional Court will definitely be raised on the basis of Van der Merwe 
and one may be justified to think that the distinction between marriages in and 
out community of property may become less visible in the near future.    
 
47   The court explains the position as follows: “The insolvent debtors are both the appellant and her  
 husband, for when spouses are married to one another in community of property debts incurred by  
 one spouse generally accrue to them both. ... Similarly, the remedies provided by the Insolvency Act  
 24 of 1936 are available against both spouses for recovery of the debt that is owed by both of them.  
... When the estate is equestrated for recovery of the joint debts of the spouses, both spouses become  
 ‘insolvent debtors’ for purposes of the Insolvency Act, with the consequence that the property of both  
 of them (comprising their undivided interests in the joint estate as well as separately owned property)  
 is available to meet the claims of creditors.” (Par 4-7.)   
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Lastly, it appears that the court may have misdirected itself when it took as its 
point of departure that the true reason underlying the rule that parties may not 
sue each other is to be found in “the boundless patriarchy in a setting where the 
husband wielded marital power over the wife.”48 This exposition can not be 
accepted. The court, it is suggested, failed to distinguish between the 
administration of the joint estate (marital power) and the nature of joint 
ownership. The real issue before the court related to the question whether a 
claim for damages is tenable given the unity of the estate. The administration of 
the estate was not at issue. Against this background, the court’s reference to 
the husband’s marital power, and evolving societal notions of gender equality 
within marriage and also of the equal worth of spouses may lead to a 
conclusion that the court reasoned along a line of argument that was not 
applicable in the circumstances.49     
 
4      Conclusion   
 
Prima facie the decision in Van der Merwe serves as an example of the 
Constitutional Court’s zealous dedication to adhere to its constitutional 
obligation to develop the common and statutory law to comply with the norms 
and values of the Constitution. In this respect the approach of the court is in 
step with previous decisions:   
 
The common law supplements the provisions of the written 
Constitution but derives its force from it. It must be developed to fulfil 
the purposes of the Constitution and the legal order that it proclaims 
– thus, the command that law be developed and interpreted by the 
courts to promote the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’. 
This ensures that the common law will evolve within the framework of 
the Constitution consistently with the basic norms of the legal order 
that it establishes. There is, however, only one system of law and 
within that system the Constitution is the supreme law with which all 
other law must comply.50   
 
 
48   See text accompanying n 22 supra.   
49   See Estate Sayle v CIR 1945 AD at 396.  
50   Pharmaceutical MNFRS of SA: In re Ex parte President of the RSA 2000 2 SA 674 (CC) par 49.  
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It is clear that in the South African dispensation where the courts have 
constitutional enforcement powers, they have the last word on the meaning of 
the constitutional text and its application to a specific area. They can 
consequently overrule legislation that is inconsistent with the Constitution as 
they have interpreted it.51 In this respect constitutional interpretation sometimes 
gravitate towards the counter-majoritarian dilemma as the exercising of the 
power of judicial review to strike down acts of a democratically elected 
legislature may thwart the will of the people.52 It certainly needs no elaboration 
that this is exactly what has happened in Van der Merwe.53 However, it is 
suggested that the court should have considered the consequences of its 
decision as this decision bridges a fundamental difference between marriages 
in and out of community of property.  
 
51   Currie and De Waal Constitutional and Administrative Law at 35.  
52   Ibid. The authors convey the concern that the counter-majoritarian dilemma could diminish the 
 legitimacy of South Africa’s new constitutional order - borne out by the public response to the 
Constitutional Court’s first major decision in which the death penalty was declared unconstitutional 
and invalid. The ruling of the court was attacked as out of step with public opinion. In casu the court 
held that the question is “not what the majority of South Africans believe a proper sentence for 
murder should be. It is whether the Constitution allows the sentence.” (S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 
391 (CC) par 87.) This approach was echoed ia in a series of decisions relating issues in respect of 
gay and lesbian relationships (Langemaat v Minister of Safety and Security 1998 3 SA 312 (T); 
Satchwell v President of the RSA 2002 6 SA 1 (CC); Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population 
Development 2003 2 SA 198 (CC); J v DG, Department of Home Affairs 2003 5 SA 621 (CC); 
NCGLE v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 2 SA 1 (CC); LGEP v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 1 SA 
524 (CC); Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs 2005 3 SA 429 (SCA)) and resulted in marriages of 
homosexuals being legally recognised in the Civil Unions Act 17 of 2006. In Fourie the court deals as 
follows with the ‘majority of South Africans’ argument: “The remaining justification sought to be 
advanced … invokes the acknowledged fact that most South Africans still think of marriage as a 
heterosexual institution, and that many may view its extension to gays and lesbians with 
apprehension and disfavour. Six years ago, the Constitutional Court acknowledged that revoking the 
criminal prohibitions on private consensual homosexual acts touched ‘deep convictions’ and evoked 
‘strong emotions’ … We must do the same. Our task is to develop the common law in accordance 
with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. In this our sole duty lies to the Constitution; 
but those we engage with most deeply in explaining what that duty entails is the nation, whose 
understanding of and commitment to constitutional values is essential if the larger project of securing 
justice and equality under law for all is to succeed.” (Italics added.) (Par 20.) 53  No attention will be 
paid in this contribution to the counter-majoritarian dilemma. See however, Okpaluba 2003 CILSA 
25-64; Roederer 1999 SAJHR 486-512; Hoexter 2000 SALJ 484-519.  
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